Foreword

Roméo Dallaire
Retired generals rarely write prefaces to nonmilitary books, but this is a rare book on a topic of crucial importance. The United Nations provided me with no serious briefing, scholarly or journalistic, before posting me to Rwanda in 1993. Major Brent Beardsley, my excellent assistant, scoured libraries and bookstores before our departure and put together a few basic facts. Only when we reached Kigali was he even able to purchase at a local shop a map of the city of Kigali and our areas of immediate responsibility. Such cavalier attitudes toward the needs of peacebuilding staff members permeated the UN system in the early 1990s, but, as later developments in Rwanda made clear, the success of UN peace operations requires rigorous and early input from experienced scholars and practitioners.
When "spoilers" undermined implementation of the Arusha Accords and the Rwanda genocide against Tutsi unfolded in spring 1994, most member states, especially those with seats on the UN Security Council, retreated to the narrowest notions of their core self-interests and mustered no comprehensive vision of genocide prevention or any recognition that protecting civilian lives was a vital responsibility of national leaders and the UN system itself. Neither the provisions of the UN Genocide Convention nor the concept of "human security" sufficed to mobilize states against mass atrocities aimed at destroying an entire human group. Only the desperate postgenocide discovery of sovereignty as responsibility, a concept pioneered by Francis Deng with Roberta Cohen at the Brookings Institution, 1 lit the way toward concrete implementation of the concept of "Never Again," a legacy of the Holocaust and World War II that, until the late 1990s, was honored rhetorically, but never in practice.
As 2 Unlike the Rwandan crisis, "the geopolitical importance of the Balkans to the U.S. and its NATO allies constituted a powerful impetus for action against Milosevic."
3 The Racak massacre of forty Kosovar Albanians in January 1999 and the failure of the Rambouillet Peace Talks in February of that year compelled President Clinton to explore the military option.
4 Chalk and our team concluded in their 2009 study that "Ultimately, the NATO intervention was motivated by a confluence of narrowly perceived U.S. national interests, moral imperative, and the desire to demonstrate NATO's continued military prowess and prestige." Enabling leadership, enhancing coordination, building capacity, and ensuring knowledge are the central tasks. That means presidents and prime ministers who make preventing mass atrocities a national priority for their governments and appoint a focal point person to lead the genocide prevention agenda across the government. It means permanent legislative committees to serve as watchdogs ensuring that the executive branch of government is given the necessary resources and follows through on its commitment. It also means overcoming the tendency to seal off vital intelligence on looming mass atrocities by creating an atrocities prevention board to share information across the government, galvanize diplomacy, craft carefully targeted foreign aid, and, if necessary, deploy military resources in mass atrocity response operations. And, finally, it means civil society groups and media focused on mass atrocity prevention and implementing "the responsibility to report." 7 Most political leaders still don't understand that their nation's self-interest is tied to preventing mass atrocities against other human beings, especially while they are haunted and intimidated by the specters of Iraq and Afghanistan at election time. President Obama's Atrocity Prevention Board is a very important step in the right direction, but even it, in practice, is not yet the dynamo needed to energize the U.S. government's prevention efforts. Interests and perceptions matter, and it may take disasters like the Ebola epidemic and its worldwide ramifications for public health to highlight for political leaders the indirect connections between atrocity prevention in faraway lands and the national security of their citizens. Dr. Jay Keystone, head of the Tropical Disease Unit at the Toronto General Hospital, tied these threads together in our 2009 study, when he wrote: "Preventing genocide and crimes against humanity are front line tasks in our fight to maintain public health security right here in North America. Our politicians and public health officials need to lead in this area." 8 I like this book. I like the editors' recognition that we still have a lot to learn and that it will take a truly interdisciplinary approach to learn it. I like their focus on viewing prevention through the lenses of theory, policy, and practice. And I like the fact that it is a book written with students, our future preventers, in mind. The greatest challenge we will face is to convince political leaders to wisely use the insights and recommendations developed by these authors. And that will not be easy when we consider the hurdles they face, even those with the best will in the world. As political scientist René Lemarchand recently wrote: "we need to remind ourselves that it is in states where poverty is rife, political institutions are failing and human rights are abused that we should expect the greatest amount of turmoil."
9 But no one ever said the job would be easy! I believe that priority should be given to a carrot-and-stick approach, encouraging and harnessing a broader idea of national self-interest to counter political leaders' fears about backlashes after intervention and the costs to their states of foregoing the lures of profits earned from arms sales and resource control. One useful approach is for international institutions like the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN to provide compensation to the smaller nations for the direct and indirect costs of prevention and to recognize more vigorously the sacrifices that taxpayers in wealthier countries make when their leaders undertake peace diplomacy. Once national leaders grasp the practical importance of R2P, renewing their commitment to financing growing expertise that improves operational understanding of other cultures, languages, and histories is the next crucial step. The convergence of national interests and mass atrocity prevention will one day be obvious to all, but we have a long way to go -the transition from noble words to practical action is essential. dr. dana zaret luck is a licensed psychologist who specializes in clinical neuropsychology and serves as the managing partner of the Mattis and Luck Center for Neuropsychological Services, LLP. By viewing R2P through a psychological lens, she seeks to draw attention to the devastating impact of atrocity crimes on individuals and groups and to raise the level of awareness in the R2P and policy-making communities of how the trauma and recovery process for victims, perpetrators, humanitarian workers, and others who have been exposed to atrocity crimes should factor into policy and practice. 
